In modern warfare, command and control (C2) systems are found in warships, aircraft, tanks, and other land vehicles. These C2 systems are used for, among other things, the deployment of friendly assets and control of sensors and weaponry during military operations. A typical C2 system includes processing elements, communications elements, and control elements. Using a variety of displays, these elements provide information about a tactical environment to one or more observers. Each observer might monitor one aspect (or a few aspects) of the overall tactical situation and communicate about that aspect with other observers. As a result, a “community awareness” is cooperatively developed, which leads to a tactical decision.
In a large set-piece military operation, such as a battle between large warships, C2 systems such as these might suffice. Increasingly, however, asymmetrical battles are becoming more commonplace. In an asymmetrical battle, one or more smaller, typically high-speed platforms engage a larger more powerful platform. For example, a coordinated attack by a large group of high-speed small boats might be used to overwhelm the defenses of a larger, more powerful naval foe. Such an attack might take place while a warship is moving and the normal C2 personnel are manning their control stations. Alternatively, an asymmetrical attack might take place while a defending warship is stationary, during a time when weapons, sensors, and C2 systems are more likely to be manned at a reduced level; for example, when the warship is in port and anchored or tied to a pier.
To further complicate matters, new tactical and strategic sensing systems provide an ever-increasing amount of information to the C2 center. This flow of information must be rapidly assimilated by the C2 personnel who are responsible for making tactical decisions. These sensing systems include multiple sources on-board a host warship (i.e., the warship which contains the command and control system) as well as sources located external to the host warship. On-board sources might include low- and high-resolution infrared (IR) sensors, forward looking infrared (FLIR) sensors, low and high resolution Electro-optical (EO) visual spectrum sensors, Radars, Ladars, and/or Electronic Signal Monitoring (ESM) devices. External sources might include friendly vessels, shore based observers, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's), Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV's), satellites and/or other intelligence assets.
In addition, conventional C2 systems are susceptible to corruption of a radar track by transference between a suspected hostile contact and a neutral or friendly contact. Such transference can occur during long-term monitoring of a suspected hostile contact. In many cases, while a radar track of a suspected hostile contact is being monitored, it “merges” on a radar display with that of a non-hostile contact. As a result, the radar tracks can not be resolved by available radar tracking algorithms. When this occurs, the radar tracks of the two contacts are indistinguishable from that point onward. In order to reconfirm the identities of the two contacts, additional intelligence resources must be allocated. In environments where there are numerous radar tracks and several of the tracks simultaneously begin to converge on a defending host platform, there is usually insufficient time to reconfirm the identity of previously determined hostile contacts. As a result, C2 personnel are faced with the dilemma of having to consider engaging a contact that is no longer confirmed as hostile or allowing the contact to close to a range where there might be insufficient time to engage it.
Once the tactical situation has been assessed and tactical decisions have been made, it is equally difficult with conventional C2 systems to reliably disseminate decisions and their associated action assignments. In the face of an attack by a significant number of high-speed small boats, for example, the C2 process would be a near continuum of detection, identification, tracking, targeting, engagement, and engagement assessment events that would quickly overload the C2 center's ability to organize a defense of the host warship.
A means for improving the ability of C2 personnel to assimilate incoming sensor information, rapidly develop an awareness of an overall tactical situation, and disseminate tactical decisions, therefore, is desirable.